Report 256 · Defense Tech
What a jammed GPS approach falls back to
On the evening of 9 November, suspected jamming knocked out satellite navigation for dozens of aircraft over the North Sea and the Netherlands. Seven arrivals into Amsterdam Schiphol reported problems, and Dutch air traffic control says satellite-based approaches were disrupted. All seven landed safely. The coverage stopped at "backup systems." The more useful story is which backups, why they were still switched on, and what this event does not prove about airports that no longer have them.
What is known about the night
Air Traffic Control the Netherlands (LVNL) told the newspaper NRC, which first reported the incident on 15 November, that seven aircraft heading for Schiphol reported disrupted GPS and that RNP approaches were affected. LVNL called jamming a likely or plausible cause, said it had no spoofing reports that week, said the aircraft landed safely with controllers' help, and said flight safety was not affected. It reported the event to the Dutch Authority for Digital Infrastructure (RDI), which is investigating. According to the Dutch infrastructure ministry, dozens of aircraft lost the signal.
Outside analysts went wider. Analysis of flight-tracking data cited by the Belgian broadcaster VRT put the count near 80 aircraft over the Netherlands, Belgium, eastern England and northwestern Germany, most at high altitude. GPSwise counted about 50, for about twenty minutes. John Wiseman, who runs the GPSJAM map, placed the window at 18:08 to 18:27 local time and a possible source 80 to 110 nautical miles north of the island of Texel, at an altitude consistent with a ship, while cautioning that the location is uncertain.
NRC reported that six Russian-flagged vessels were in the wider area, three of them part of a Russian military cargo convoy. Nobody has established that any of them did it. I'm leaving attribution there, where the evidence leaves it. IO+ reports a similar Dutch event in July that affected 58 aircraft.
Why an RNP approach simply stops
An RNP (required navigation performance) approach is a published path to the runway that the aircraft's flight management system flies using satellite positioning, with onboard monitoring of whether the position is good enough. At Schiphol it is not optional which sensor feeds it. The Dutch Aeronautical Information Publication says it in one line:
To execute an RNP approach the use of GNSS equipment is mandatory.
The same section adds that approaches to the lower LPV minimums must also use EGNOS, Europe's satellite augmentation signal, and that every IFR aircraft in the Schiphol terminal areas needs an RNAV 1 approval. So when a jammer drowns the GPS signal, the RNP approach isn't degraded. It's gone. EASA's current bulletin on GNSS interference lists exactly that among the effects: "Inability to maintain GNSS-based Area Navigation (RNAV) and/or Required Navigation Performance (RNP)."
This is where jamming is, operationally, the kind problem. EASA's bulletin notes that jamming effects "are typically immediate and noticeable," while spoofing is harder to detect and "thus posing more safety risk than jamming." A jammed receiver goes dark and says so. Crews see the alert and stop trusting it. I wrote about that asymmetry in jamming versus spoofing; 9 November was the loud kind.
The fallback is older radio, still switched on
Schiphol's radio-navigation table lists an Instrument Landing System for runways 06, 18C, 18R, 22, 27, 36C and 36R, most of them rated Category III, the low-visibility end of the scale. An ILS is a pair of ground transmitters on the airfield that the aircraft's own receiver tracks for lateral and vertical guidance. It doesn't touch a satellite. Add radar controllers who can vector aircraft onto it, and a GNSS loss on approach becomes a workload problem, not an emergency. That is what LVNL describes. The Belgian provider skeyes made the same point to VRT: aircraft that can't fly a satellite approach can switch to procedures like the ILS.
That outcome was not an accident. EASA's Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4, revised on 3 July 2026, asks national authorities to make sure non-GNSS infrastructure, "particularly Instrument Landing Systems (ILS), Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) stations and Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) stations are made available and kept operational as required." It asks air navigation providers to "be prepared to provide navigation assistance to aircraft (including vectoring where radar or independent surveillance is available and validated) as long as needed." Schiphol on 9 November is that recommendation working as written.
Here's the tension. Europe spent the last decade moving approaches onto satellites, partly so it could retire ground beacons. When Schiphol's three main landing runways got RNP approaches with vertical guidance (a SESAR project marked complete in September 2020), the project notice said the legacy NDB beacons around the airport were taken out of service. NDBs are the oldest, least precise navaids, and losing them didn't matter on 9 November because the ILS was there. But the direction of travel is toward fewer ground transmitters, and the bulletin's advice is to keep the ones that matter. Both can be true; the trade has to be made deliberately, runway by runway.
Why altitude decides who gets hit
One detail in the reporting is worth an EW officer's footnote: most of the affected aircraft were high up. That's what radio geometry predicts. A jammer's reach is set mainly by line of sight, and the radio horizon grows with the square root of height at both ends. A standard rule of thumb puts it at about 4.12 times the sum of the square roots of the two heights in meters, in kilometers. For a transmitter on a ship's mast (call it 20 meters) and an airliner at cruise (about 10,700 meters), that's roughly 440 km. For an aircraft at 3,000 feet on a final approach, it's roughly 140 km.
If the source really was 80 to 110 nautical miles north of Texel, it was something like 220 to 300 km from Schiphol by my rough estimate. That means a low aircraft on final near the airport would have been below that transmitter's horizon, while aircraft at altitude across four countries were in view of it. I don't know where in their arrivals the seven Schiphol aircraft lost the signal, and LVNL hasn't said. Treat this as a geometry check on the reported pattern, not an analysis of those flights. It also explains why a ship-borne jammer is such an efficient tool. It doesn't need to be near an airport to reach the airport's arrival stream while that stream is still high. I covered how analysts reconstruct these footprints from aircraft data in what a GPS-jamming map shows.
What this does and doesn't prove
It proves that a well-equipped hub with ILS on its runways and radar controllers absorbs a twenty-minute GNSS outage without drama. That matches the EASA bulletin's description of jamming as noticeable, and its advice to keep ground aids and vectoring ready.
It doesn't prove much about the harder cases. The bulletin itself asks authorities to "evaluate the impact on aerodromes with GNSS-only approach and departure procedures," and to make sure information on suitable alternates is ready. A small airfield whose only instrument approach is an RNP has no ILS to fall back on. It also doesn't prove anything about spoofing, where the receiver doesn't go dark but confidently reports the wrong place, which the same bulletin rates as the bigger risk. And a twenty-minute event is not a sustained campaign. The bulletin asks for contingency plans that cover "large-scale GNSS short-term and long-term jamming and/or spoofing events," and asks crews to plan for longer approach legs and holding in the fuel. Congestion is how a long jamming event bites a busy hub.
What would change my read: an RDI finding on the source, an LVNL account of where in their approaches the seven aircraft lost GNSS, or a Dutch decision to change which ground aids stay on. If any of those lands, I'll update this post in place.
Sources
- European Union Aviation Safety Agency, Safety Information Bulletin 2022-02R4, "Global Navigation Satellite System Outage and Alterations Leading to Communication / Navigation / Surveillance Degradation," issued 3 July 2026. (Primary source. Full 10-page PDF read. Source of the effects list, the jamming-versus-spoofing comparison, and every quoted recommendation. The bulletin is information only; its recommendations are not mandatory.)
- LVNL, eAIP Netherlands, GEN 1.5 "Aircraft instruments, equipment and flight documents," issue effective 29 October 2026. (Primary source. Section 2.3 read. Source of the quoted GNSS requirement for RNP approaches, the EGNOS requirement for LPV minimums, and the RNAV 1 mandate in the Schiphol terminal areas. eAIP addresses change with each AIRAC cycle.)
- LVNL, eAIP Netherlands, AD 2 EHAM (Amsterdam/Schiphol), section 2.19 "Radio navigation and landing aids," issue effective 29 October 2026. (Primary source. Source of the ILS listings and categories for runways 06, 18C, 18R, 22, 27, 36C and 36R.)
- SESAR Deployment Manager, "Three new RNP approaches at Schiphol Airport: 146th SESAR deployment project completed," 9 September 2020. (Read. Source of the RNP approach rollout on the three main landing runways and the statement that legacy NDB beacons were taken out of service.)
- AeroTime, "Suspected GPS jamming affects 80 aircraft, disrupts Schiphol approaches," 16 November 2026. (Read. Source for LVNL's statements to NRC, the VRT-cited count and altitude pattern, Wiseman's time window and source estimate, the vessel details, and skeyes' comments.)
- IO+, "GPS disruption affects dozens of aircraft over the Netherlands," 16 November 2026. (Read. Source for the RDI investigation, the GPSwise count and duration, and the July event with 58 aircraft.)
- Eline Boshuizen, NH Nieuws, "Gps van tientallen vliegtuigen verstoord boven Schiphol: loop je dan geen gevaar?" 16 November 2026 (in Dutch). (Read in the original Dutch. Source for the ministry's "dozens of aircraft" statement and LVNL's description of guiding aircraft in.)
The NRC report itself was not opened; its content is cited through AeroTime and IO+. The radio-horizon figures are my own back-of-envelope arithmetic using the standard 4/3-Earth approximation, with assumed heights (20 m mast; 10,700 m and 914 m aircraft), and ignore terrain, antenna patterns and jammer power. The 220 to 300 km distance is my rough estimate from Wiseman's reported range north of Texel and the distance from Texel to Schiphol. The description of how RNP and ILS approaches work is general aviation knowledge, not taken from these sources.